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The Government of Zimbabwe is undertaking the second phase of land reform that began 
in 1980. Following the conference between the Government and the donor agencies, the 
former are identifying projects to support land reform. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Agence Franc;aise de Developpement have identified a programme of geographical and 
thematically limited nature. The programme would be centred on rural development 
mainly in the District of Guruve, benefiting from the support of the current project 
financed by the French Global Environment Facility, and on feasibility projects already 
identified in Central Mashonaland. This involves giving support in the setting up of small 
farmers benefiting from land reform in the following cases: communal areas, forest 
margins ( extension of cotton), areas on farms bought back by the State, irrigation areas 
with private sector intervention . The investment section and the feasibility study would 
be financed by AFD. The long-term agricultural section (new techniques of the DDoubly 
Green Revolution D and fodder intensification) would be presented for financing to the 
French Fund for World Environment. Private French aid would also be sought. The MAE 
could finance the monitoring and evaluation system of a certain number of typical cases 
of setting up of farmers. The activities will include local innovative experiments, analyses 
and proposals concerning techniques of land planning, follow-up research on land, 
agricultural, ecological, environmental, social, economic and financial planning techniques. 
These analyses, as well as an economic and financial model measuring the impacts of the 
reforms, could be used in the studies of national institutions that are in charge of Land 
Reform. The monitoring and evaluation would be carried out in co-operation with 
different Zimbabwean University teams with which relations already exist within the 
framework of current projects. 
3 
EXECUTIV E SUMJ\t[ARY 
The Government of Zimbabwe is undertakjng a second phase in the land reform, which 
commenced in 1980. This reform is a continuation of the first phase in the sense that it 
redistributes land after having bought it back from the previous owners at market prices. 
It also marks a rupture because the Government designates the farms to be bought back 
using specific criteria (large size, non utilisation, proximity to rugh density areas D) and 
fixes the price (with recourse to an administrative court) whilst taking into account market 
prices. The land would be transferred in the form of a lease or would be re-sold directly 
to the beneficiaries. These beneficiaries would be appointed on the basis of specific 
criteria, in particular the farming capacity. The technical models proposed are more 
diversified than in the first phase. 
The Government has approached the Donor Agencies and has requested their assistance 
in dealing with the expenses that will be incurred by land reform. In reality, the situation 
of the State budget (large domestic debt, high public expenditure, and little investment) 
does not allow it to finance the whole reform. The recent conference held between the 
Government and the Donors gave the former the opporturuty to state their point of view. 
From trus it may be concluded that there is general consensus for the State to undertake 
reform but it must first make use of State property for redistribution; the purchase price 
must be market-related; the large farms of government digrutaries must not be excluded 
from reform; the methods of operation must be diversified (recourse to the private sector, 
no monopoly by Government agencies), the technical models must also be diversified; 
follow-up/evaluation must be carried out and the entire matter must be placed in the hands 
of a single public agency. 
Experience in land reform throughout the world has shown that there must first be a large 
transfer of capital. The sums paid to the owners may have different destinations: 
investment in remairung farms, investment in other sectors, exit of capital. It is also the 
opportunity to create agriculture of small farmers which is not only a self-sufficient type 
of agriculture but also plays a role in general economic development. In order that reform 
may be efficient on a macro-economic level, several conditions must be satisfied: I) all 
infrastructure and services must be available in order to set up the new small farmers, ii) 
the political climate must be favourable for reinvestment in the national economy, of 
capital obtained at the time of the land sale, iii) the export sectors must be competitive in 
order to guarantee long-term growth and to include in the farming sector the 200 OOO new 
candidates for employment each year. 
On the basis of these considerations, French co-operation could propose a support 
programme for the re-settling of small farmers in the areas bought back by the State. This 
programme would be of a limited geographical and thematic nature and would fit in with 
the general dynamics of reform under the following three aspects: 
Participation in the financing of infrastructure in the re-settlement areas; 
Defirution of a tool to simulate economic and financial effects of the reform facilitating the 
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testing of different possible developments. 
The programme would take place in the Central Mashonaland region, parti cularly in the 
district of Guruve where there is already experience and knowledge from french assistance 
French experience (Biodiversity Project) and project infrastructureto be used. The project 
would work in different kinds of situations • 
Densely populated communal areas ; 
Existing settlement areas ; 
New settlement areas according to the plans proposed and with improved plans ; 
New forms of settlement in partnership with the private sector, in particular 
irrigation ; 
Settlement of new agricultural areas and agricultural fronteers in areas free of 
tsetse fly. 
As it is a programme it is suggested that different instruments of financing should be 
sought • 
AFD for interest-bearing investment within the framework of rural 
development of the di stricts, as well as prior studies and monitoring-
evaluation ; 
FFEM (Fonds Franc;ai s pour I Environnement Mondial) 1 for the 
financing of lasting agricultural and livestock procedures via the promotion of 
farming methods such as the ::J Doubly Green Revolution O ; 
- MAE for the supply of technical assistance with regard to food safety D 
Regional Fonds d OAide et de Cooperation- regarding credit for the Foreing 
Relations Ministry budget (techrucal assistance, support missions, participation 
of local teams) . 
This first programme hypothesis was presented to the Ministers of rural development, 
agriculture, finance, environment and water who approved the spirit and basic outlines. 
Several potential partners were approached (ARDA, DDF, University, NGOs, 
Commercial Farmers D Uruon, Indigenous Farmers Uruon) and they showed their interest. 
UNDP which played a key role in the dialogue between the Government and Donor 
Agencies came up with the approach which has been proposed. The deputy representative 
of the World Bank proposed that the monitoring/evaluation procedure of the programme 
be consistent with that which the Bank is going to propose, and pointed out that it would 
have preferred the pooling of bi-lateral aid in a common project. 
l. Objectives of the Mission 
The objective was aimed at measuring basic interest and identifying a co-operation 
programme that fits in with the perspective of Land Reform in Zimbabwe. 
In this context, programme is taken to mean a collection of projects and actions of a 
different nature (investment, studies, research, training) working towards the objectives 
1 French Global Environment Facility 
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of land reform, and integrating if necessary the contributions of different instruments of 
French Co-operation (loans, donations, technical assistance, support missions D). In effect, 
any co-operation in such a complex sector n integrating political , legal, economic, 
financial , agricultural, ecological, environmental , institutional and management aspects D 
basically requires the mobilisation of a large spectrum of instruments. 
An identification mission was organised jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Agence Frarn;aise de Developpement, in particular by the French Ambassador to France 
in Harare, the Director of the Regional Agency of the AFD in Johannesburg and the AFD-
PROP ARCO representative in Harare. 
The mission was led by the following people • 
for AFD • 
Henry de Cazotte, Director of Regional Agency 
Philippe Lecrinier, Geographical Manager 
Franc;ois Jullien, ACAOO Department D Rural Development Diversity 
Olivier Girard-Reydet, Regional Representative 
For Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
Bernard Hoareau D Cultural Attache 
Michel Griffon D Head ofECOPOL Programme C Cirad 
Samuel Gahigi D Cultural and Co-operation Services 
2. Land Reform Problems 
2.1 Historical Roots of the Land Structure (brief summary) 
European colonization began at the end of the 19th century ( creation of Rhodesia) 
supported by agriculture and mining. Colonization of the best land forced the indigenous 
population into areas with little potential and in areas close to the colonial farmers in order 
to be in proximity for labour. This geographical separation was codified by the creation 
of commercial agricultural zones and indigenous areas. The granting to the white colonials 
of a monopoly in sale of foodstuffs limited the expansion capacity of small African 
agriculture. The increase in the black population slowly increased the pressure on the 
ecosystems of the reserve areas. Under international pressure, possibilities for black 
inhabitants to have access to agricultural land ownership was first granted after the second 
world war. Due to a lack of capital there were few candidates. Nevertheless this permitted 
the emergence of African agricultural entrepreneurs. 
In 1965, under pressure from the United Kingdom to recognise the civil rights of 
indigenous people, Rhodesia preferred to declare unilateral independence. The 
Government of Ian Smith, in spite of a timid attempt at land reform, made no changes to 
the existing structure for 15 years. 
During this period, the increase in the African population made the redistribution ofland 
even more necessary. The profound inequality D 4 500 European farms occupied 50% of 
the land and about one million of African families lived on 40% of the land D led to the 
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guerrilla war which ended in independence in 1980. 
2.2 1980 Land Reform 
The agreements of Lancaster House with the United Kingdom (leading to independence) 
laid down an interdict on all expropriation for a period of 10 years. The land reform was 
to be carried out according to the market principle ( J willing seller D willing buyerO). 
This formula convinced a large majority of white farmers to remain in Zimbabwe. Using 
former land of the Crown (now national) and abandoned farms, the Government began 
mass re-settlement The objective was to re-settle about 160 OOO families over 9 million 
hectares. 
This redistribution was mainly organised to the benefit of Dcommunal areas D (previously 
black reserves) but also agricultural workers, populations of villages grouped during the 
colonial period, refugees and existing small farms . It is probable that a number of veterans 
from the war period were compensated in this way. 
The populations were settled (resettlements) on lots of land according to different 
schemes : 
individual lots of Sha of arable land with access to common pastures. 
Dwellings were grouped into villages (about 25 families); the model was 
provided for application in 80% of the cases ; 
cooperatives integrating all the farming and living functions; this scheme 
of collectivism was soon abandoned ; 
for livestock areas, small individual lots for agriculture, pastoral areas 
for village cattle (permanent use) and common pastoral areas for commercial 
production (so-called D 3/3 D model) . 
The State remained owner of the land . The beneficiaries are obliged to respect the terms 
and conditions of land use (authorised production, number of animals per hectare D.). 
Furthermore the Government has maintained an area of direct intervention in the form of 
State farms . Political opposition denounced in some cases the adquisition of farms by 
politicians. 
The re-settled beneficiaries receive technical assistance form different para-statal 
organisations including the main ones : 
DERUDE (Department of Rural Development) and DDF (District 
Development Fund) for the setting up of infrastructure in the re-settlement 
areas ; 
ARDA (Agricultural and Rural Development Authority) for State farms 
AGRITEX (Agricultural Technical and Extension Services) for 
technical assistance ; 
AFC (Agricultural Finance Corporation) for credit. 
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Between 1979 and 1990, about 2,8 million hectares were acquired for about 57 000 
beneficiaries, that is much less than the objectives set for 1986 (9 million hectares, 160 
OOO families) . 
The Government was unable to finan ce the entire programme. From 1983 onwards it has 
had to deal with macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment leading to a 
reduction in public expenditure, as well as recurrent droughts, which has drastically 
reduced economic growth and State resources. 
The main conclusions drawn from this experience may be summarised as follows : 
although the State has been engaged in supplying infrastructure and 
basic farming services (tracks, bore holes, labour), often the beneficiaries only 
benefited from them too late due to logistical reasons or problems with 
financing; the commencement of farms was badly affected. 
As the beneficiaries had little agricultural experience they had limited farming 
capacity of the land ; 
The financing of agricultural reform from the State budget can only be 
ensured to the extent of the proclaimed re-settlement objectives. 
2.3 Re-launch in 1990 
The Lancaster House agreements ceased to apply in 1990. At this time the Government 
wanted to radicalise its approach to land reform. It set aside an amount of 8,3 million 
hectares of land for re-settlement For this purpose the law of 1992 (Land Acquisition 
Act) made provision for : 
Expropriation of large farms ; 
Financial compensation according to a Dfair price D ; 
Payment in local currency ; 
Possible recourse to an administrative court but the former could only rule on the 
legitimacy of the requisition and the amount of compensation. 
The international community, in particular the British Government condemned this 
development which was more radical and it reduced its public aid to land reform. 
Nevertheless between 1990 and 1996, very little changed. Land acquisition was limited 
to about 250 000 hectares due to a lack of public financing . Thus, in total, after 16 years 
of land reform ( end 1996), about 3 million hectares have been acquired ( that is 14 72 
farms), about 550 OOO hectares of former property of the crown remains available and 66 
850 families have been re-settled in 247 re-settlement areas. This is far from the objectives 
pronounced in 1980 (9 million hectares, 166 OOO families). 
It is clear that the Government does not have the means to acquire the 6 million additional 
hectares required and to finance the means to make this land viable so that it can be made 
available to its beneficiaries. 
It is within this context that the Government is appealing for international aid. 
8 
2.4 Current Problems (end 1998) 
Agricultural Reform is Economically Constrained (V. Caupin 1998) 
Between 1980 and 1990 the State hired many civil servants thus greatly increasing public 
consumption (5% per year), taking into account constant growth and corresponding tax 
revenue. This wager was based on positive appreciation of the macro-economic situation 
and potential development : reasonable international debt, stable trade balance, diversified 
exportation (agriculture, ore), controlled inflation and stable currency. 
Nevertheless, this economy is vulnerable. A part of its prosperity is linked to the policy 
in the past of industrial diversification and substitution of importation during the period 
of the international embargo. However today economic opening is threatening certain 
branches in spite of it being a land-locked country, which affords it natural protection. 
Besides growth depends a lot on agriculture, farming industry and farming supply, and all 
three sectors, as well as credit for agriculture, depend on the climate. The droughts of the 
past decade (1988, 92, 95) have greatly affected growth. Within this context, the 
announcement in 1997 of the expropriation of 1500 farms led to a drop in the currency. 
The Central Bank lost the monetary battle, the Government had to devaluate, increase the 
rediscount rate as well as taxes. 
Within this context growth is somewhat threatened . It is ensured by exports, domestic 
demand (which remains high), but investment is reduced, implying a lack of confidence 
in the private sector, which mainly remains in the hands of the original foreign 
populations. The Government has given in to salary pressure and finances its deficit on the 
national capital market (public shares bought by insurance companies and pension funds) . 
Internal public debt is increasing (47% GIP in 1996 and 49% of State revenue) . The 
request for financing by the Government had led to the increase in interest rates, which 
in tum has increased the servicing of the debt. 
The Government of Zimbabwe is therefore caught in a vicious circle that prevents it from 
financing the purchase of any new land or financing farming infrastructure in a significant 
manner. 
Land reform runs the risk of being economically inefficient. 
Any land reform, which provides for the re-purchase of land, is confronted with a series 
of considerable macro-economic problems : 
It is not in the interest of the State to remain owner of landed property as by nature it is 
not very profitable : it must therefore re-sell as quickly as possible to beneficiaries, 
otherwise it must rent or transfer in the form of hire-purchase in order to limit the effect 
on the budget and on the financing capacity of the economy ; 
The capital obtained by the landowners through the sale of land may be taken outside of 
the country, invested in Zimbabwean agriculture (remaining farms) or in industry or local 
services. The sums available would in theory be quite considerable (about 150 Million 
US$ for the purchase of 6 million hectares), and their investment in the local economy 
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would most probably be in agriculture. Furthermore, in order to do this, the white farmers 
must be fully ensured ofland security. This investment in agriculture would lead to growth 
as it would create employment and improve the trade balance because most of the 
additional production would be absorbed by the regional market; 
ew small farmers need infrastructure so that they may rapidly become involved in the 
logistics of agricultural production, thereby helping them to overcome poverty and to 
produce for the market. Between the public investment period and the emergence of 
farmers who capable of paying tax, the period can be variable. If it is long, agricultural 
reform will continue to be an operation that shows deficit for the State. 
In the case where the State were to envisage buying all the coveted land and to then only 
sell it slowly, and not to ensure the large land owners of absolute security for the future, 
and not to do everything to ensure that the new farmers become rapidly economically 
viable, then theeconomic and financial risk could be important for the Government. 
This qualitative reasoning must be quantified. 
Land reform is also an ethical and political problem 
History has shown that successive Governments delated the application of the reform, 
either by limiting redistribution ( during the period of Ian Smith), or due to lack of 
financing (from 1983 onwards) . At the same time, the population of the communal areas 
(example. Reserves) have increased at a high rate (undoubtedly within the region of2,5% 
to 3% per year) which adds to land pressure and increases political tension. It seems no-
one has ignored it totally but if political discourse has indicated a desire to act rapidly 
since 1980, in reality the re-settlement rate is neither at the level of necessary land re-
settlement nor at the level of demographic growth: in nearly 20 years less than 1 % of the 
families of the communal areas have been re-settled whereas at the same time the 
population in these areas has doubled. 
Faced with these stakes it would be logical for political debate to focus on the efficiency 
of the mechanism to be implemented, the efficiency of re-settlement, of investment, and 
thus of organisation. In reality the debate remains essentially focused on the aspect of 
DcompensationD of the past and therefore limits the decision only to re-settlement. In this 
context (little re-settlement, political pressure) the State is especially under observation 
by all parties. Accusations of favoritism in the allocation of land with regard to political 
allies of the Government restricts the debate only to the political aspect. In response the 
ruling political party actively supports radical land re-settlement in order to satisfy its 
moral electoral mandate. 
On this basis what are the means proposed by the Government and for which ones is he 
requesting aid from the international community ? 
3. Government Policy : aims and limitations 
During the conference between the Government and the Donor Agencies, the Government 
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presented an orientation document laying down the principles and methods of future 
reform which is now presented as Oland reform D. 
3.1 Principles and models of land reform 
The Government hopes to acquire 5 million hectares to settle 91 OOO families over a 
period of 5 years. The first three years will constitute a launch phase (inception) which 
would be of an experimental nature. 
The land concerned would correspond to the following criteria : 
Abandoned land ; 
Under-utilised land ; 
Principle of one man O one farm ; 
Absentee-owned land ; 
Land adjacent to communal land. 
The list of land concerned must be published in the official gazette. The owners may 
object to the admissibility based on the principles mentioned above. For example, the 
objections of owners with forecast investment plans may be taken into account Legal 
objections shall be dealt with in the Administrative Court . 
Acquisition may be made according to the following three methods: 
Land designation: the land will probably be acquired over 10 years and 
the price will be defined according to the conditions of the land act of 1992 ; 
Compulso,y Acquisition: the land will be acquired within 12 months 
following the decision ; 
Willing seller, Willing buyer: the transaction is carried out according 
to market regulations. 
The beneficiaries will be: Dpoor families from over-populated communal areas, 
agricultural workers, particular groups especially women, former soldiers, people with 
diplomas in Agricultural training, qualified farmers with the means of ensuring good use 
of the land. 
As in the case of the land reform of 1980, the Government defines technical models 
(production systems). There are now five models : 
Lots of arable land of 3 to 6 ha and communal pastures ( without 
grouping in villages): DModel A1 D; 
Individual Lots of arable land and pastures ranging from 50 to 300 ha 
according to the regions : DModel A2 D; 
The 3/3 model: a lot of 180 ha is distributed with 1/3 for agriculture, 
1/3 for small-scale stock farming and surrounding livestock, and 1/3 for 
pastures of a commercial nature; 
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Re-organisation of ~ decongested ~ communal land by applying model 
[rrigated models: l to 10 ha ofland that can be irrigated with or without 
pasture areas. 
The tenure must be free hold property under the name of the Head of the famil y or the 
spouses. The agreement of the spouses is necessary before every sale. Before obtaining 
the property, the beneficiaries will have a leasehold of 99 years. At the end of 10 years 
they can become owners if they so desire. The pastures form part of communal land. 
The beneficiaries pay the fees for the cost of the allotment. At the time of purchase, the 
sums paid during the leasehold are deducted from the amount of the transaction. 
The implementation of installation operations can be carried out by Government agencies 
as well as NGOs, local communities and farming organisations. 
3.2 A priori Elements of Evaluation 
The philosophy given is based on four factors: 
Security of land tenure ; 
Existence of security networks for citizens of communal land ; 
Promotion of investment and accumulation of capital ; 
Promotion of lasting management of land resources. 
This philosophy marks a decisive development of the Government towards the promotion 
of a category of small private owners in the re-settlement areas as well as in the 
Ddecongested D communal areas . 
The fact that the Government presented its Land Reform vision to the international Donor 
Agencies created room for debate. However it is difficult to know what are the margins 
of flexibility and adaptation of the present model. The different visits gave the impression 
that adaptation is possible but respecting the philosophy of the political decisions and in 
all the cases, and that discussion in this regard is possible. For example : 
The possibility to first and foremost use State farms for re-settlement ; 
Application of reform to all large land owners even those of African 
origin and close to the Government ; 
Possibility to create average sized properties for the entitled parties D 
or others D with purchasing capacity ; 
Possibility for the Commercial Farmer Union (Large European Land 
Owners) to be operators themselves ; 
Possibility of associating large properties and the newly set-up 
properties according to flexible formulas facilitating the hiring of material and 
marketing. 
Following the visit to Minister Msika (Cabinet Committee or Resettlement and Rural 
Development) it can be taken that the Government is wide open to adaptation of the 
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technical models and the methods of implementation of re- settlement. However flexibility 
regarding tenure was not discussed. It is an important point that must nevertheless be 
discussed, as the financial consequences fot the State are really important. 
The development of the overall model and its philosophy will undoubtedly develop 
according to the attitude of the Donor Agencies. The World Bank has proposed to go 
much further in the diversification of the implementation agencies first and foremost 
participation of the private sector, and even churches. Besides the Government is currently 
recording the contributions of bilateral donor agencies and their preferences regarding 
methods of intervention. This should result in a great diversity of forms . 
Where the adaptation and flexibility of the mechanism seems to be of interest to many, the 
economic and financial evaluation of the entire process of land reform does not seem to 
concern decidors . This however is of capital importance. The Government document does 
present a brief cost analysis,but not yet an economic and financial analysis. It is possible 
that the World Bank will do this at the time of the granting of its loan. 
The economic and financial situation of the reform will depend a lot on the rapidity with 
which farming infrastructure is delivered, the availability of short-term financing 
(agricultural campaigns), medium-term financing and long-term financing (purchase of 
land, infrastructure). It will also depend on the rapidity of the response of the new farmers 
to the market and the functioning of this market (marketing, exportation). 
In short, the success of land reform will depend on varying aspects from a policy point of 
view, regarding the efficiency of implementation, the economic efficiency of the new 
farmers, with the entire framework having a great effect on the financial and economic 
situation of the country. 
On the political level, the Government will have to carefully manage the process in order 
to secure national capital and investment of thecommercial agriculture sector. A good 
move would be to make sure that large commercial agricultural concerns are not the 
losing parties, but in fact are also winners. The Government will also have to be credible 
with regard to applicants for land because of the political pressure. Allocation must 
therefore be carried out with transparency. It must also, in order to maintain a peaceful 
political climate, find solutions to the latent dissatisfaction in the suburbs where a large 
part of the population is unemployed. This unemployment is partly linked to the land 
situation. The spontaneous burst of peri-urban agriculture gives the impression that the 
setting up of worker gardens could have an important economic and social impact. 
With regard to implementation, the Government cannot ignore that the different agencies 
(ARDA, DDF, AGRITEX) are not financially and materially capable of dealing with the 
re-setlement of so many people in such a short time.It may also be said without 
exaggerating that the methods of these agencies are too bureaucratic and sometimes not 
enough efficient. Some imagination is required. The diversity of the operators should 
facilitate experimentation and the formulation of efficient settlement techniques. These 
settlement techniques should take the knowledge of previous farmers into consideration, 
ensure the participation of the new farmers in the planning of the area (placement of the 
dwelling, placement of bore holes, layout of plots, irrigation schemes, areas for 
forestation, first ploughing, agricultural, economic and financial advice, common 
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institutions and regulations applicable to a single area D.) 
With regard to economic efficiency of farming, success depends on the availability of 
start-up products (seeds, fertiliser) , the availability of credit to buy animals, the facility to 
market the products and the prices used. Here again, the capacity of the marketing boards, 
AGRITEX and AFC to deal with thi s, must be assessed and solutions must be 
pragmatically found, by addressing the private sector from case to case. 
The re-settlements which will be the most successful will certainly be those which combine 
good organisation of the new farmers and agreements with large neighbouring farmers 
when possible or more generally with the private sector. 
4. What could be the Position with regard to French Aid ? 
With regard to the policy of co-operation, French like European Union aid is interested 
in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. The region in general is experiencing land reform 
problemOs similar to those of Zimbabwe (Zambia, Namibia, South Africa). That which can 
be done to facilitate transition to African family agriculture in Zimbabwe is therefore 
potentially useful for other countries. 
This agriculture may be in a situation to accept new techniques in particular those of 
mulching and no tillage:minimum tillage D more geneally speaking:Doubly Green 
Revolution D in the areas of production of cotton and maize. These techniques are 
especially promoted by French agencies . 
Lastly, by participating in land reform of this extent, French aid could assist considerably 
in the reduction of poverty and food security in the region . 
Besides the different French agencies and operators could present a large range of 
possibilities of intervention: financing of infrastructure, financing of operation to improve 
global environment, technical assistance and research as well as training, and possible 
private assistance. The amalgamation of these skills could guarantee an efficient project. 
Nevertheless the amount which may be allocated is limited and can mainly be made in the 
form of loans. This means that interventions must be targetted for investments of rapid 
and high return. The relatively experimental context of the re-settlement methods and the 
difficulties faced by public agencies mean that the project financing must be coupled with 
a support mechanism guaranteeing efficient implementation and the adoption of efficient 
high rapid return schemes and farming systems. 
This can therefore only be done in a region where the assets are concentrated in order to 
limit transaction costs and in order to have satisfactory visibility.The mission helped to 
verify the interest of the Ministers concerned with regard to setting up a project in Central 
Mashonaland, in particular in the areas where there the OBiodiversity Management 
Project D is already operating and financed by FFEM (use of existing infrastructure and 
knowledge acquired), and adding a monitoring-evaluation mechanism. This monitoring-
evaluation would allow for the adjustment or modification of re-settlement models which 
are envisaged and consequently to advise the Government. The ministers contacted were 
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receptive in this regard. 
By sending such a rapid mission, French Co-operation gave proof of its interest in the 
procedure to the Government. The deputy resident representative of the World Bank 
noted the efficiency in the rapidity of the response and the pragmatic side of the first 
programme assumption. He nevertheless was sorry that this possible financing was not 
going to be put in a pool of funds :J managed by the World Bank O in order to simplify 
procedures. Such a solution would result in a Dtwo-way game O between the Government 
and all the donors behind the World Bank. This formula would limit the diversity of 
expenences. 
5. Proposal of a Programme 
A first proposal must be made which O if accepted O would become the subject of a 
feasibility study and complementary work agreements. 
5.1 Objective 
This is a Rural Development programme of different types of settlements of beneficiaries 
of land reform in Central Mashonaland (in particular, the District of Guruve) .This 
programme would include two main components: 
Investment ; 
Support in the definition of land, technical and organisational models by means of a 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism 
The types of areas where investment in the programme could be made 
The reconnaissance carried out by the mission facilitated the identification of several 
typical cases for the setting up of new farmers : 
Former settlement areas : in these areas, the new land policy should 
permit access to property. The infrastructure is O according to available 
information O still rudimentary and agricultural equipment is insufficient. It is 
probable that in many cases the fertility of the soil has not been maintained and 
that production would depend very much on the climate unless there were small 
reserves of water; 
New settlement areas ( that is on totally private property or on a 
combination of private property and communal property) in non irrigable areas: 
in these cases, planning will have to be undertaken with the participation of the 
beneficiaries, collective institutions set up, infrastructure implemented, 
improved production techniques proposed, and the running of agricultural 
services ensured. 
Agricultural fronteers and new areas in the Zambezi valley where the 
eradication of the Tse Tse fly would permit the colonisation of land and the 
expansion of cotton growing in conditions where it is difficult to maintain soil 
fertility . In these areas proposals must be made for special forms of tenure, 
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apropriate agricultural techniques and it must be ensured that market 
mechanisms function. 
Areas for building dams and creating small irrigated areas with the 
participation of the private sector: in these areas, the forms of association 
between the large private farmers and the beneficiaries of land reform 
procedures must be drawn up, rules of collaboration established, planning 
carried out, techniques finalised and the proper running of the market ensured ; 
Lastly, the communal areas from which the beneficiaries of land reform 
would originate : these areas have their regulations and methods of governance. 
They require infrastructure, planning and the use of apropriate agricultural 
techniques . 
The pre-feasibility study must define these types of situations. 
5.2 Operations to be carried out 
Sequence type of operations to be carried out 
Depending on the case, the sequence of operations to be carried out will be quite long. In 
the more complete cases, it would include : 
Analysis of the characteristics of populations benefiting from re-
settlement ; 
Drawing up of layout plans with the different parties concerned: the 
recipients, the private sector concerned, technical agencies and technical 
operators D ; 
Implementation of infrastructure ; 
Definition of farming systems that would be adapted following an 
experimental field phase with the farmers (see below) ; 
Constant monitoring and evaluation of the implementation and the 
ecological, economic and social effects ; 
Reflection on the lessons to be drawn from experience, especially with 
regard to the viability of the process of reform. 
Investment and Infrastructure 
The new settlement areas require varied infrastructure : 
Access roads and farm roads ; 
Farming infrastructure: dams, irrigated areas, planning of the 
countryside, fences, electricity ; 
Social infrastructure: boreholes for potable water, communal housing. 
The new farming systems: introduction of green manure cover crop plots 
and improved pastures. 
Most of the farms produce maize for foodstuffs and for sale, tobacco for sale and breed 
cattle. For family requirements, groundnuts, sunflowers, and various vegetables are 
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grown. The existence of a long dry season and especially irregular rainfall over time D in 
spite of an average rainfall of 700 to 1 OOO mm O creates uncertainty and risk for farming. 
Any water saving technique is therefore of prime importance in the search for less risky 
and higher production. Besides the quality of the soi l is generally mediocre, especially on 
communal land The maintenance of fertility is difficult for small farmers . A few visits to 
the area have shown that the spreading of animal manure is practised in most cases; the 
use of fertili ser is well known but is less utilised due to costs and difficulty of access to 
credit. 
ln this context, the introduction of mulches and green manure cover crops must be tested. 
Experiences in similar agro-ecological areas (Madagascar Tulear) could be utilised. 
Vegetal coverage and minimum tillage techniques could be proposed on maize based 
farming systems for the entire area and for cotton in the Zambezi Valley. 
The pasture areas present great biological diversity due the age of the savannahs of the 
region. Some grasses (urochlea mozambicensis or Siba Grass and Digitaria milaryiana 
or Creeping blue Grass) are endemic. The introduction of Stylosenthes by direct over-
sowing could increase farming capacity and increase animal production. Formulas tested 
in the North oflvory Coast should be tested in the area. 
A mechanism of agronomic monitoring of plots in association with the farmers should be 
implemented . 
Socio-economic Evaluation and Monitoring 
A mechanism of monitoring and evaluation by means of investigations should facilitate the 
recording of the development of the areas implicated in the programme and question 
several aspects in particular : 
Satisfaction of beneficiaries ; 
Problems encountered during re-settlement from a legal, institutional 
and organisational point of view ; 
Viability of new systems from an ecological and environmental point of 
view ; 
Economic and Financing viability of new systems for new farmers, and 
for the operators. 
Economic and Financial Analysis of the Reform 
Field experience should give exact information on the main economic and financial 
parameters of land reform, in particular the costs and benefits for all the recipient parties. 
All the information could then be used in thedesign of possible contrasted development 
scenarios, for example: rapid or slow re-distribution of land, nominal or fairly high land 
prices, variable financing capacity from the State (importance of aid for transactions, aid 
for infrastructure), nominal or fairly high credit rates, rapid and efficient or slow and low 
efficient implementation, reinvestment of capital obtained from the land sales either in 
agriculture or other sectors or investment abroad, etc D. The effects on production, 
demand, prices, Government accounts (State budget, trade balance, balance of payments), 
employment and financial markets would be evaluated from a simplified model of the 
agricultural and foodstuffs economy. 
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By this means the Government could analyse the viability of all the different alternatives 
of reform and their application to the economic and financial plan. 
5.2 First Assumptions on the means 
The Agence Franc;aise de Developpement - if it goes ahead D will analyse for its part the 
pre-feasibility study and possibly the feasibility of an investment section. 
The management of a support mechanism (monitoring and evaluation as well as 
stimulation of farmers) requires the presence of a full time technical assistant. This 
possibility must be analysed within the framework of the investment section of the project. 
As Zimbabwe is in charge of the co-ordination of the political aspect of food security in 
the SADC region, other kinds of technical assistance could also be optained for the food 
security aspects of the program .. 
The development of farming systems using cover crop- minimum tillage techniques and 
pastures improvement, both contribute to food security, to the fight against soil erosion 
and above all to carbon sequestration in the soils. As a result of this, the FFEM (French 
Global Envirenment Facility) could be requested for financing the greenhouse reduction 
aspect of the program. 
The monitoring-evaluation of the agronomic, pastoral, ecological, economic and social 
aspects require, on a technical level, the specific presence of an expert. It could be done 
by a young professionnal (volontary assistant) trained in correspondingspecific techniques. 
He (she) could be assisted by: 
Support missions on the protocol (agronomy, pastoralism, economics) 
Works of students of the University of Zimbabwe and French 
universities; 
Analyses by universities and research workers in Zimbabwe; 
Lastly, the macro-economic and financial synthesis may be carried out by : 
Specialist missions of French researchers; 
Specific works of the Zimbabwean universities. 
5.3 Planning of a schedule 
If accepted by the different agencies concerned and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
programme the Programme could be drawn up in detail in the first months of 1999 so that 
the different requests for financing may be made (AFD, FFEM, FAC) in 1999 and so that 
commencement may be envisaged for Autumn 1999. 
The preparation of the project (analyses missions), the definition of monitoring and 
evaluation agreements and the first studies could begin in 1999, as well as the macro-
economic analyses. In this regard, the sending of one young professionnal, of three 
support missions, logistical means of support and expenses for remuneration of 
Zimbabwean universities and researchers may be proposed for financing of the MAE from 
1999. 
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Since the Young Professionnal Programmme will take end, it could be envisaged to create 
a position for a similar expert from the Un.ired Nations, UNDP, and to use corresponding 
fiduciary funds . This fonnula would be particularly welcome in 2000 and would reinforce 
the link with UNDP who is playing an important dialog role in Zimbabwe between the 
Government and the Donor Agencies. 
5.4 Partners 
The programme should work on three levels: 
National level with the co-ordination entity ( which could be created 
soon), in particular with TSU (Technical Support Unit) which should be the 
focal point for analysis, monitoring and evaluation; 
The level of implementation organisations which are either Local 
Governments or public agencies (ARDA, DDF D) and possibly the private 
sector; 
The level of sub-contractors: private sector, NGOs, works companies, 
university (CASS), consultants . 
This aspect must be the subject of more detailed analyses within the framework of pre-
feasibility and feasibility studies. 
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